On the Design Dilemma in Dining Cryptographer Networks

Jens O. Oberender and Hermann de Meer
5th International Conference on Trust, Privacy & Security in Digital Business 2008

In a Dining Cryptographers network, the anonymity level raises with the number of participating users. This paper studies strategic behavior based on game theory. Strategic user behavior can cause sudden changes to the number of system participants and, in consequence, degrade anonymity. This is caused by system parameters that influence strategic behavior. Additionally, conflicting goals of participants result in dilemma games. Properties of message coding, e.g. collision robustness and disrupter identification, change the game outcome by preventing dilemmas and, therefore, enhance anonymity. Properties of anonymity metrics are proposed that allow for strategic user behavior.

Publication @UniPassau

  author    = {Jens O. Oberender and
               Hermann de Meer},
  title     = {On the Design Dilemma in Dining Cryptographer Networks},
  booktitle = {TrustBus},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {163-172},
  ee        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85735-8_16},
  crossref  = {DBLP:conf/trustbus/2008},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de}

  editor    = {Steven Furnell and
               Sokratis K. Katsikas and
               Antonio Lioy},
  title     = {Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business, 5th International
               Conference, TrustBus 2008, Turin, Italy, September 4-5,
               2008, Proceedings},
  booktitle = {TrustBus},
  publisher = {Springer},
  series    = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  volume    = {5185},
  year      = {2008},
  isbn      = {978-3-540-85734-1},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de}





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